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NOTES
The Law of Medical Malpractice in Missouri
Medical malpractice has been defined as "the treatment of a disease
by a physician or surgeon in an unskilful manner, or in a manner
contrary to accepted rules, causing injurious results to the patient."'
This note will attempt to formulate the Missouri law regulating
those who engage in the "art of healing" as it has evolved in civil
litigation.2 The subject of factual causation will not be included,
not because it is unimportant but due to the technical difficulties that
are necessarily involved in any discussion of that subject., Nor will
there be any section devoted to the problem of damages in mal-
practice.4 The scope of this note is to define the duty of the medical
practitioner, those acts or omissions that amount to a breach of that
duty and the defenses that are available to the practitioner.
The Form of the Action
Malpractice at its inception was inextricably tangled up with the
law of implied contract.5 The liability of the practitioner was pred-
icated upon the fact that he held himself out as possessing sufficient
skill and care for his undertaking.( However, as the action was more
closely scrutinized the courts, largely on the basis of public policy,
began to recognize that the action sounded in tort.7 In Barnhoff v.
Aldridge,8 plaintiff, less than five years and more than two years after
injury by the defendant practitioner's alleged malpractice, brought an
action on the contract. There was a five year statute of limitations for
actions on the contract and a two year statute of limitations for ac-
1. MALOY, MEDIcAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERs 318 (1942).
2. The criminal law of medical malpractice is beyond the scope of this note
which is restricted to problems arising in civil litigation.
3. An intelligent discussion of medical causation requires considerable medical
background.
4. Problems of damages are not peculiar to malpractice litigation.
5. For a discussion of the contractual liability of physicians and surgeons see
Miller, The Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953 WASH.
U.L.Q. 413.
6. See, e.g., Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 Atl. 1116 (1893); Small v.
Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880); Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N.H. 460 (1853).
7. In Hales v. Raines, 146 Mo. App. 232, 130 S.W. 425 (1910), public policy
was the very ground upon which the court refused to limit the practitioner's duty
to the scope of his contractual agreement. For a discussion see text accompanying
note 11 infra.
8. 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931).
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tions of malpractice. Defendant demurred to the petition and the
trial court sustained the demurrer. On appeal the court held, "it would
seem very advisable and almost necessary to do what has been done in
some jurisdictions, namely recognize the fact that an action for mal-
practice is neither a purely tortious or contractual action, but is a
hybrid .... 9 However, it was decided sixteen years later that the
action of malpractice sounded in tort. In Baysinger v. Hanser'0
plaintiff's wife died after having been operated on by defendant.
Plaintiff brought his action eighteen months after the operation and
defendent made a motion to dismiss alleging that the petition showed
on its face that it was barred by the one year statute of limitations
placed on all wrongful death actions. Plaintiff, relying on the Barn-
hoff decision, replied that an action of malpractice was sui generis
and survived under the two year statute of limitations that applied to
malpractice actions. The court in affirming trial court's action in
sustaining the motion to dismiss held that malpractice is a tort action
and as such survives only under the wrongful death statute.
Since it is now generally recognized that the action sounds in
tort, it is also well established, perforce, that the duty of the practi-
tioner is one that is imposed upon him as a matter of law and not
limited by the contractual nature of the practitioner-patient relation-
ship. However, although the practitioner cannot diminish his duty
by contractual agreement, he may expand his duty by entering into
a contract to cure.1
As a tort malpractice is a generic term under which may be sub-
sumed actions against medical practitioners for negligence,12 reckless-
ness 3 and intentional torts.'"
I. DUTY
If a medical practitioner is held liable in malpractice, it is because
the law has imposed upon him a duty with which he has not con-
9. Id. at 772, 38 S.W.2d at 1031. (Emphasis added.)
10. 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W.2d 644 (1947).
11. E.g., Vanhoover v. Berghoff, 90 Mo. 487, 3 S.W. 72 (1887).
12. Negligence forms the basis for the majority of the malpractice litigation.
13. When the selection of the treatment is the issue, it is submitted that before
the practitioner can be held liable his breach must approach recklessness. For a
discussion of the selection of treatment see text accompanying notes 93-95 infra.
14. In Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1961), plaintiff went to defendant
who was an extractionist to have several teeth removed. Defendant mistakenly
pulled all her teeth. Plaintiff brought her action in malpractice, but it is sub-
mitted that a battery action could have been just as successful. See Mohr v.
Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905) ; but see Hershey v. Peake, 115 Kan.
562, 223 Pac. 1113 (1924), distinguishing between the intentional and the unin-
tentional excess of authority.
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formed. This section will be concerned with when the duty arises, to
whom it is owed and the standard by which it is applied. Before em-
barking upon an extensive analysis of the duty of the medical practi-
tioner, it would be beneficial to survey rather generally for purposes
of comparison the duty and the standard of application that is em-
ployed in the ordinary negligence case.
The negligent actor is held to a duty of due care. In applying this
nebulous phrase to the facts of any given case, the jury is told to
measure the actor's conduct by the standard of the reasonably pru-
dent man.15 This fictional character is "a hypothetical person ...
who represents a community ideal of reasonable behavior."'" Un-
doubtedly this standard is formulated in the jury's mind partly from
its own experience and partly from its concept of what the reason-
ably prudent man would do. No witness is asked what he would
have done under the circumstances, nor is the jury asked to de-
termine what it would have done. 7 The jury's final determination
must be based not upon what men actually do, but upon what this
hypothetical creation would have done. Indeed the key to the question
of reasonableness lies not in "what actually happened, but what the
reasonably prudent person would have foreseen as likely to hap-
pen. ...""I Thus the standard that is applied in measuring the con-
duct of the negligent actor in the normal negligence case is a con-
ceptualization of reasonable prudence with the focus trained upon
the actions of a mythical man. With this as a background the duty of
the medical practitioner can be more easily illuminated.
The medical practitioner is held to possess and exercise that degree
of skill and care that is possessed and exercised by the average prac-
titioner of the same school practicing in similar localities.
15. TORTS, RESTATEMENT § 283, comment a (1934).
The words "reasonable man" denote a person exercising those qualities of
attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgment which society requires of its
members for the protection of their own interests and the interests of others.
16. PRossER, TORTS § 31 at 124 (2d ed. 1955). Seavey refers to the standard as
a "fictitious personality with whose conduct we compare the actor's ... " Seavey,
Negligence--Subjective or Objective? 41 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1927).
.17. Professor Green in his work, JUDGE AND JURY, points out the undesirability
of having the jury attempt to measure the conduct of the negligent actor in terms
of its own experience or in terms of any mathematical computation. Rather the
trial courts in their instructions attempt to objectify the abstractions of. reason-
ableness and prudence. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 161-64 (1930).
18. James, Nature of Negligence, 3 UTAH L. REV. 275, 281 (1953).
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A. Medical Practitioners-
Before deciding the question of who may be liable in malpractice,
it is necessary to decide what constitutes the practice of medicine.
The friendly neighbor and the corner druggist engage in the prac-
tice of medicine when they "advise and prescribe" treatments and
cures. Applying this definition literally, it is conceivable that the
neighbor and the druggist could be held liable in malpractice. The
relevant Missouri statutes shed little light upon the subject, for al-
though they define the individuals who are authorized to practice
medicine20 and those individuals who are not authorized to do so,
they fail to reveal when one not authorized to do so shall be deemed
to be engaging in the practice of medicine.
A workable definition of the practice of medicine was stated by the
court in Longan v. Weltmer.21 It was held that one who holds him-
self out to be a "healer of diseases"22 may be held liable in mal-
practice. However, the difficulty with this definition is that it seem-
ingly affords a class of defendants, whom it is intended to compre-
hend, a ready defense. Since they are being held to have practiced
medicine solely because they have held themselves out as healers of
disease, it would seem anomalous to hold them liable for compliance
with the practice upon which their liability is predicated. 23 Thus, if D
holds himself out as being able to heal by magnetism, conformity to
the art of magnetic healing, although not recognized by the medical
profession or the statutes, should logically afford D a perfect defense.
However, it was held when this defense was urged that one who holds
himself out as a healer of diseases, but belongs to no recognized
school, shall be held to the standard of the average physician or
surgeon.24 This definition has excluded the friendly neighbor and
the corner druggist, for although they may advise and even pre-
scribe, they cannot conceivably be said to hold themselves out as
healers of disease. It includes a class of possible defendants that
19. 'Medical practitioners' as used in this article is a term of art. It is intended
to encompass not only those who deal in dispensing of medicine but also those
who may be liable in malpractice.
20. See generally, Mo. REv. STATS. §§ 331.010-.100 (1950) (Chiropractors);
Mo. REv. STATS. §§ 332.010-.390 (1959) (Dentists); Mo. REV. STATS. §§ 334.010-
.260 (1959) (Physicians and Surgeons).
21. 180 Mo. 322,79 S.W. 655 (1904).
22. Id. at 333, 79 S.W. at 658.
23. This was in fact the defense that was urged in Weller v. Palapao Lab.,, Inc.,
197 Mo. App. 47, 191 S.W. 1056 (1917). See also Owens v. McCleary, 313 Mo. 213,
281 S.W. 682 (1926).
24. In Weller v. Palapao Lab., Supra note 23, at 60, 79 S.W. at 1060,
the court said that "while ... defendant did not hold itself out as a practicing
physician ... it was ... under the like obligation of a physician and surgeon."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss3/7
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are commonly called "quacks." However it would seem to bring
within its ambit another class of possible defendants: faith healers.
Faith healers and Christian Scientists fit the description of people
who hold themselves out as healers of disease but belong to no recog-
nized school. The difficulties with holding that these people are
practicing medicine, and therefore liable in malpractice are mani-
fest.2 5 There are no reported cases in Missouri in which a faith
healer or Christian Scientist has been sued for malpractice in a civil
action; however, there is one criminal case in which a Christian
Scientist was charged with unlicensed practice of medicine.20 The
court there held that although defendant was holding herself out as
a healer of disease, the diseases that she was seeking to cure were
the diseases of the soul and not of the body and therefore not within
the purview of the statute.27 Thus the practice of medicine may be
defined, for purposes of malpractice, as the healing of physical
diseases.28
B. Skill and Care
Much of the early effort of the Missouri courts was spent in estab-
lishing the distinction between skill and care. Skill was held to be
the actual knowledge that the practitioner possessed while care re-
ferred to the way in which he administered the treatment to his
patient. This distinction afforded the malpractice plaintiff a pro-
cedural device by which he had two separate and distinct causes of
action. In Vanhoover v. Berghoiff the court held that plaintiff was
"at liberty to take his position before the jury that defendant was
25. Among other things, this would infringe severely upon religious freedoms.
26. Kansas City v. Baird, 92 Mo. App. 204 (1902).
27. Although there are no reported cases in Missouri dealing with the liability
in malpractice of a faith healer, it would appear that the Baird case would be
extended to exempt faith healers from liability. If the faith healer fails to con-
form to the accepted practices of "faith-healing," e.g., if he attempts to heal a
fracture and no other healer of his cult would have attempted it, it is submitted
that plaintiff would be wiser to proceed in negligence.
28. An interesting problem is posed by the psychiatrist, for he is not in a strict
sense a healer of physical diseases. The psychiatrist heals diseases of the mind
as distinguished from physical diseases or diseases of the soul and although there
are no reported cases in Missouri, it is submitted that a pychiatrist would be liable
in malpractice.
It is not necessary that the patient be human for veterinarians may be held
liable in malpractice. See Breece v. Ragan, 234 Mo. App. 1093, 138 S.W.2d 758
(1940).
29. 00 Mo. 487, 498, 3 S.W. 72, 76 (1887). See also Sennert v. McKay, 56
S.W.2d 105 (Mo. 1932) ; Rothschild v. Barck, 324 Mo. 1121, 26 S.W.2d 760 (1930) ;
Trask v. Dunnigan, 299 S.W. 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927); Fowler v. Burris, 186 Mo.
App. 347, 171 S.W. 620 (1914) ; Gore v. Brockman, 138 Mo. App. 231, 119 S.W.
1082 (1909); Robertson v. Wenger, 131 Mo. App. 224, 110 S.W. 663 (1908).
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ignorant and unskillful, or that he was negligent and careless, or
... that he was both unskillful and negligent."30
There is one other very cogent reason for the efforts of the Mis-
souri courts to establish this distinction. The action of malpractice
as noted above 3 was born in the law of contract, and, therefore, the
duty of the medical practitioner was recognized as being contrac-
tual in nature. It would then logically follow that defendant could
urge as an unassailable defense that he has only contracted to use the
care which he himself possessed. Thus, a practitioner who did not
possess requisite skill would be immune from liability merely by
exercising his maximum skill while a practitioner who possessed
greater skill would be vulnerable to greater liability. To avoid this
anomalous result the court established the distinction between skill
and care. The practitioner was deemed to have promised that he
possessed the requisite skill and would exercise the requisite care,
thus subjecting the unskillful practitioner to liability on a contract
theory.
At the present time there seems to be no very compelling reason
for insisting upon the preservation of this distinction. The law of
malpractice has become more sophisticated. The courts have gener-
ally recognized that the duty of the medical practitioner, although
born in contract, is akin to a tort duty. Thus a practitioner who has
attempted to treat a patient without possessing the requisite skill is
negligent. This approach, therefore, necessarily puts in issue whether
the practitioner possessed sufficient skill to have treated the patient
and whether he treated the patient with due care. In Rothschild V.
Barck32 the court held that "the term 'negligence' not only covers a
lack of care, but the failure to exercise skill which the person posses-
ses, or the attempt to exercise skill which he knows he does not pos-
sess."
33
Some writers 34 have expressed concern at the current neglect of
this area of the law of medical malpractice. It is submitted that the
terminology would not of itself focus attention where it is needed in
this area. The terms "skill and care" were invented by the court to
fill a gaping breach in the law. This breach has now been filled by
re-definition of the action, and this artful language is now but a non-
functional vestige of an ancient concept. Although the phrase is
still used by many trial courts in their instructions to the jury, no
30. Vanhoover v. Berghoff, 90 Mo. 487, 498, 3 S.W. 72, 76 (1887).
31. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
32. 324 Mo. 1121, 26 S.W.2d 760 (1930). See also Sennert v. McKay, 56 S.W.2d
105 (Mo. 1932) (citing with approval).
33. Rothschild v. Barck, 324 Mo. 1121, 1128, 26 S.W.2d 760, 763 (1930).
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case has been decided since 1900 in which the distinction was de-
terminative.
C. Average Prartitioner
As noted earlier" the duty of the negligent actor in the ordinary
negligence case is due care, and the standard by which it is applied
is the mythical reasonably prudent man. The duty that is impressed
upon the medical practitioner is considerably less demanding. He
does not have to meet any standard of reasonableness nor of pru-
dence. The degree of skill and learning that he must possess and
the degree of care that he must exercise is that "which is ordinarily
possessed and exercised by the members of his profession." 30
This provides the malpractice defendant with a significant ad-
vantage. He need not attempt to show that the procedure that he
pursued in treating his patient was reasonably prudent, but rather
he need only establish that it is the procedure employed by other
members of his profession. The "negligence" defendant on the other
hand has no such defense available to him.37 Hence proof of con-
formity to the customary treatment employed by his fellow practi-
titioners can be a complete defense for the "malpractice" defendant."
If there is conflicting testimony as to what the custom for the treat-
ment is, the malpractice defendant is given a further advantage.
"[U]nless it be shown that the course pursued was clearly against
34. In a book review of PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE, 1961 WAsu. U.L.Q. 86,
Orville Richardson expressed concern over this area of the law of malpractice and
the neglect that the bar and the bench have accorded it. It is suggested that the
phrase "skill and care," notwithstanding Mr. Richardson, could be shortened to
care without detriment to the law of malpractice.
35. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
36. Owens v. McCleary, 313 Mo. 213, 222-23, 281 S.W. 682, 685 (1926). (Em-
phasis added.) See e.g., Heier v. Funsch, 61 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933);
Hales v. Raines, 146 Mo. App. 232, 130 S.W. 425 (1910); Robertson v. Wenger,
131 Mo. App. 224, 110 S.W. 663 (1908).
37. There are three distinct views on the effect of custom in the ordinary
negligence case. The majority view is represented by Bimberg v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 217 Minn. 187, 14 N.W.2d 410 (1944). The court held that custom was ad-
missible to show due care but that it was merely evidence of due care and the
defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the strength of it alone. Mc-
Nally v. Colwell, 91 Mich. 527, 52 N.W. 70 (1892); Jenkins v. Hooper Irr. Co.,
13 Utah 100, 44 Pac. 829 (1896) represent a substantial minority holding that
custom is not admissible as evidence of due care. Bandekow v. Chicago, B.&Q. Ry.,
136 Wis. 341, 117 N.W. 312 (1908) represents the third view holding that custom
is controlling. For an excellent discussion see Morris, Custom and Negligence,
42 COLUm. L. Rsv. 1147 (1942).
38. It should be noted at this point that there is a class of cases in which
custom has the same weight as in the ordinary negligence cases, and within that
class of cases it does not therefore afford the malpractice defendant a complete
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the course recognized as correct by the profession generally"' 9 defen-
dant will be entitled to a directed verdict. The negligence defendant
in the event of a conflict in the evidence as to his negligence or free-
dom will go to the jury.
In addition to these advantages the malpractice defendant need not
exercise "his best skill and ability if he uses the care and skill which
is exercised generally by physicians of ordinary care and skill."40
The negligence defendant is held to possess what knowledge the
reasonably prudent man would possess and he is also held account-
able for any subjective knowledge that he himself actually possesses. 41
Thus if D is an ophthalmologist with special experience in the treat-
ment of glaucoma and treats a patient suffering from glaucoma, the
fact that he had had special experience would not be admissible
against him. In measuring the conduct of the malpractice defendant
the jury is not concerned with whether the treatment he selected is
reasonable nor are they interested in ascertaining what additional
subjective knowledge he possessed. The standard is simply what
other members of his profession do.
The specialist presents a slightly different problem. In McCirin
v. Grenzfedr -42 the trial court instructed the jury that if defendant
who had held himself out as an expert in the cure of hernia had not
used "ordinary skill and care," they could then find him guilty of
malpractice. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff which was
reversed; the court held that one who holds himself out as an expert
is held to the degree of care of those who "devote special study to
the treatment of the disease."43 Although it seems that the standard
for the specialist is more demanding, the court pointed out that it
affords the specialist a wider latitude in selecting a treatment."4
defense. This is developed more completely below; see text accompanying notes
96-100 infra. Professor Morris in MoRnis, TORTS § 4 at 59-60 (1953) states:
The substantive law rule is that a patient is treated improperly by his
physician, surgeon, or dentist only if the defendant has departed from the
practice of other reputable practitioners .... In suits against railroads,
banks, drovers or any defendant other than a medico the plaintiff need not
prove that the defendant departed from the ways of his craft.... But a
doctor accused of malpractice may have excusably made a medical mistake.
The conformity test is a rough and ready test of whether mistakes should
be excused.
39. Bailey v. St. Louis S.F. Ry., 296 S.W. 477, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927). (Em-
phasis added.)
40. Hales v. Raines, 146 Mo. App. 232, 241, 130 S.W. 425, 428 (1910). See
also Heier v. Funsch, 61 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933).
41. E.g., RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 290, comment e (1934).
42. 147 Mo. App. 478, 126 S.W. 817 (1910). See also McMurdock v. Kimberlin,
23 Mo. App. 523 (1886).
43. MeClarin v. Grenzfelder, 147 Mo. App. 478, 487, 126 S.W. 817, 820 (1910).
44. If the specialist were held to the standard ordinarily exercised in the com-
munity by average practitioners, then he would be precluded from employing
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss3/7
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D. Same School
The duty of the medical practitioner is reduced further by the
requirement that he be held only to the standard of his school or
branch of medicine. In evaluating whether the treatment selected by
a medical practitioner was proper under the circumstances, neither
the jury" nor the medical profession- will be allowed to decide the
question. The only practitioners who are qualified to comment upon
the propriety of any treatment are those who are members of the
same school or branch of medicine as the defendant. In order for
the malpractice defendant to be afforded the protection of the same
school requirement he must belong to a school that is recognized.
This presents two immediate problems; first, what schools are
recognized, and second, to what standard are those practitioners held
who belong to no recognized school?
The doctrine of Grainger v. Still 47 provides the answer to both
of these questions. First, the only schools that are recognized are
those that are specifically recognized by statute.48  Second, those
practitioners who belong to no school that is specifically recognized
by statute "must be held to the duty of treating patients with the
ordinary skill and knowledge of physicians in good standing. " 4 1
Substantively the effect of this rule is to forbid the jury to question
the validity of any school of medicine. The statutory sanction that
has been granted by the legislature is conclusive upon the fact finder,
and neither the fact finder nor the medical practitioner at large
can be allowed to pass upon the propriety of the treatment that any
recognized school employs. The practitioner who belongs to no school
recognized by statute does not have such shelter. The validity of his
treatment may be directly attacked by those who do not subscribe
to his methods, and the determination of the jury will be conclusive.
Procedurally the effect of the same school requirement is far
treatments beyond their scope of knowledge but that were in use among other
specialists. Thus a specialist could be held liable for employing a treatment that
the court would label an 'innovating experiment' when in fact the treatment was
well recognized among other specialists.
45. In Atkinson v. American School of Osteopathy, 240 Mo. 338, 144 S.W. 816
(1912), the court reversed a verdict for plaintiff because the instructions were so
framed as to give "the jury the right to find that osteopathic treatment was not
proper treatment." Id. at 352, 144 S.W. at 821.
46. See, e.g., Mann v. Grim-Smith Hospital and Clinic, 347 Mo. 348, 147 S.W.2d
606 (1941); Pedigo v. Roseberry, 340 Mo. 724, 102 S.W.2d 600 (1937); Reed v.
Laughlin, 332 Mo. 424, 58 S.W.2d 440 (1933); McDonald v. Crider, 272 S.W. 980
(Mo. Ct App. 1925); Atkinson v. American School of Osteopathy, 240 Mo. 338,
144 S.W. 816 (1912) ; Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114 (1905).
47. 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114 (1905).
48. See footnote 20, supra.
49. Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 214, 85 S.W. 1114, 1119 (1905).
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reaching. As stated above, in cases involving the selection of the
proper treatment by a practitioner who belongs to a recognized
school, the fact finder is not competent to question the validity of
the school's method of treatment. Thus for plaintiff in this type
action to make a submissible jury case, he must produce an expert
from defendant's school who will testify to the impropriety of de-
fendant's treatment. Practitioners of another school are incompetent
to testify to the treatment employed. However, if the issue concerns
the diagnosis of the disease the rule is quite different:
The disease is the same no matter which school of medicine the
attending physician belongs to .... They [practitioners of dif-
ferent schools] may differ as to the proper treatment of the dis-
ease after its presence is ascertained, but there is no difference
as to diagnosis.... This being so, there is no sound reason why
a physician of any school should not be a competent witness
... as to any diagnosis of any disease. The bias or prejudice of
one school of medicine against another cannot affect the question
of diagnosis, however much it might affect the treatment em-
ployed by the other school.50
Thus, a practitioner who belongs to a school other than defendant's
school is incompetent to testify as to treatment employed by defen-
dant but competent to testify as to his diagnosis or to "any scientific
fact that is, or ought to be, known to every physician and surgeon
of every school or system."5' 1
The specialist receives slightly different treatment. Only those
members of his school who "by special study and experience probably
have acquired more accurate knowledge of the right methods of treat-
ment than is possessed by ordinary practitioners of medicine"'52 are
qualified to testify as to the propriety of the specialist's treatment.
The same school requirement serves to insulate the malpractice
defendant from having his system of medicine directly attacked. If
50. Id. at 225-26, 85 S.W. at 1123. In Mann v. Grim-Smith Hospital and Clinic,
847 Mo. 348, 147 S.W.2d 606 (1941) an osteopath testified against an allopath
and the court upheld the trial court in allowing him to do so and they cited the
following with approval from Swanson v. Hood, 99 Wash. 506, 170 Pac. 135
(1918),
The rule is not that a physician of another school is incompetent to testify,
but that a defendant's treatment is to be tested by the general doctrine of his
own school, which is a very different thing; . . . the standard of exclusion
of evidence is not the school of the witness, but the premises of his testimony.
Id. at 353, 147 S.W.2d at 608 (1941).
See also Reed v. Lauglin, 332 Mo. 424, 58 S.W.2d 440 (1933) (M.D. testifying
against osteopath); Cazzell v. Schofield, 319 Mo. 1169, 8 S.W.2d 580 (1928)
(osteopath testifying against M.D.).
51. Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114 (1905). See also York v.
Daniels, 259 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. 1953) (Mortician, dentist, pathologist, M.D. testi-
fying against chiropractor).
52. McClarin v. Grenzfelder, 147 Mo. App. 478, 487, 126 S.W. 817, 820 (1910).
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the system is recognized by statute, then its soundness cannot be
questioned. Practically the malpractice plaintiff when attempting to
put in issue the selection of treatment by the medical practitioner
is faced with the burden of producing practitioners of his own school.
This consequence of the 'same school' requirement is often fatal to
plaintiff's cause of action.
E. Similar Localities
The rule that the practitioner is held only to the standard of those
practicing in the same or similar localities is peculiarly American
in its origin. 3 Apparently, it is a result of geographical rather than
legal forces. During the earlier days of this country when the com-
munication media were not well developed, the dissemination of in-
formation was quite slow. Thus it would have been incongruous to
hold that a practitioner had constructive knowledge of the latest de-
velopments in the nearest large city or in the medical centers of Balti-
more, New York or Vienna. Hence the rule at its inception was a
device to protect the much revered country doctor. He was not respon-
sible for the latest scientific advances but was liable only for those
in use in the same or similar localities. Nor was he responsible for
using the latest equipment. These restrictions upon the degree to
which a practitioner could be held constructively knowledgeable have
carried over into modern Missouri law. 4
This is, however, decidedly not the rule in England nor has it ever
been 55 England is of course a much smaller country and the oppor-
tunity for communication was always more available. However, if the
basis for the rule were merely the geographic conditions and their
effect upon communication, is the rule of any value at the present
time?
In Williams v. Chamberlain" the court said in dicta that the in-
struction of "in similar communities '5 7 was not necessary as this
requirement was created at a time when there was not an equal
opportunity for learning. However, they indicated that it was not
error to include this requirement in the instructions. The Williams
case indicates that the Missouri court may in time broaden the opera-
53. Fleming, Development in the Law of Medical Liability, 12 VAND. L. REV.
633,640 (1958).
54. See, e.g., Owens v. McCleary, 313 Mo. 213, 281 S.W. 682 (1926); McDonald
v. Crider, 272 S.W. 980 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925); Evans v. Clapp, 231 S.W. 79 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1921); Wojciechowski v. Coryell, 217 S.W. 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920)
(under like conditions): Hales v. Raines, 146 Mo. App. 232, 130 S.W. 425 (1910);
Robertson v. Wenger, 131 Mo. App. 224, 110 S.W. 663 (1908).
55. Fleming, supra note 53.
56. 316 S.W.2d 505 (1958).
57. Id. at 510.
Washington University Open Scholarship
MALPRACTICE
tive area of the similar localities rule. It is doubtful, however, if it
will be completely abolished. Although the practitioner has the op-
portunity to read many medical journals, it would still be impossible
for him to stay abreast of all the developments in all the large medical
centers of the world and still carry on a successful practice. Similarly,
although he may know of the advances in technical machinery, it may
be impossible for him to acquire and operate it. The fate of the
"similar localities" rule will probably be a modification rather than a
complete abrogation.
The practical effect of the rule can be quite harsh upon the mal-
practice plaintiff. In order to make a submissible case he may be
forced to produce a practitioner from the same small town as de-
fendant or from one that is similarly situated both from the stand-
point of population and geographical proximity to a larger city.
F. Scope of the Medical Practitioner's Duty
The duty of the medical practitioner arises when the relationship of
doctor and patient comes into existence. This relationship cannot be
forced upon the practitioner nor upon the patient, for each must give
his consent to it.58 Although this relationship is consensual in nature,
the duty that results from it and the liabilities that attach to it do not
rest upon the existence of an express or implied contract.59 Thus if P
comes to D's office to seek treatment from him, no duty arises until D
agrees to treat P. Having agreed to treat P, D's duty is not limited
by the contractual nature of their agreement. 0
Once this consensual relationship is formed, the duty that results
will endure throughout the treatment. The practitioner cannot uni-
laterally put an end to his duty. The rule was stated more fully in
Reed v. Laughlin:61
[W] hen a surgeon is employed to perform an operation, the rela-
tion of physician and patient continues until ended by the mutual
consent of the parties, the physician's withdrawal after reason-
able notice, the dismissal of the physician or surgeon by the pa-
tient or the cessation of the necessity ... 62
58. See, e.g., Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901).
59. E.g., 41 Am. Jun. Physicians and Surgeons § 71 at 193 (1942).
60. Vanhoover v. Berghoff, 90 Mo. 487, 3 S.W. 72 (1887) ; see also Barnhoff v.
Aldridge, 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931), wherein the court held that "mal-
practice is neither a purely tortious or contractual action, but is a hybrid .... "
In Baysinger v. Hanser, 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W.2d 644 (1947), it was held that the
action sounded in tort and survived only under the wrongful death statute.
61. 332 Mo. 424, 58 S.W.2d 440 (1933); Cazzell v. Schofield, 319 Mo. 1169, 8
S.W.2d 580 (1928); see also Boyd v. Andrae, 44 S.W.2d 891 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
62. Reed v. Laughlin, 332 Mo. 424, 430-31, 58 S.W.2d 440, 442 (1933).
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If the practitioner attempts to end the relationship without complying
with the above requirements, he is liable in malpractice to the patient
that he has abandoned.63
Hence, the relationship that began through the consent of the
practitioner cannot be terminated arbitrarily. A termination that
does not comply with the standards established by the court will result
in the practitioner being liable in malpractice for abandonment.
G. Duty to Warn of Serious Possible Collateral Hazards
In the past three years a new doctrine has arisen in the Missouri
law of malpractice. According to the court the seeds came into ex-
istence in Steele v. Woods"4 and were germinated in Mitchell v. Robin-
son; 5 however, an analysis of the cases leads to a different conclusion.
In the Steele case plaintiff went to the hospital for a uterus opera-
tion. It was performed successfully, and while plaintiff was recuperat-
ing, defendant noticed that there were varicose veins in her leg. He
recommended an operation for their removal to which plaintiff agreed.
After the operation for the removal of the varicose veins, plaintiff
suffered severe vascular spasms in her leg. Defendant advised her
that an operation called a paravertebral block was necessary to inhibit
the spasms. There was a conflict in the evidence concerning whether
plaintiff had ever been warned of the necessity of the block operation
and the consequences that could ensue from not having it. The result
was that plaintiff was not operated on until after gangrene had set in
and compelled the amputation of her foot. Plaintiff brought her action
in malpractice alleging that she had never been told of the necessity
of the paravertebral block. The case was submitted to a jury and the
verdict was for the plaintiff. The issue that was submitted was
whether or not defendant had advised plaintiff of the necessity of a
paravertebral block. It is important to note that defendant did not
claim that he was not under a duty to inform plaintiff of the necessity
for the operation. Indeed this was admitted as what the average
practitioner would have done in the situation.
The Supreme Court in remanding the case said that the facts
admitted of a third possibility which the instructions of the trial
court failed to frame; that defendant had informed plaintiff of the
necessity of the operation but that plaintiff due to her distraught
condition was unable to comprehend defendant's advice. Defendant
admitted that the average practitioner in this situation would have a
duty to go beyond plaintiff herself and seek the consent of her next of
kin.
63. See, e.g., Small v. Wegner, 267 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1954).
64. 327 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. 1959).
65. 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
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This is the decision upon which the doctrine of the Mitchell case is
bottomed. In the Mitchell case plaintiff was suffering from severe
emotional disorder and alcoholism. He went to defendant who recom-
mended insulin shock treatment to which plaintiff agreed. As a result
of the treatments plaintiff had convulsions and fell from the treatment
table fracturing a bone in the process. In his action for malpractice
plaintiff offered no expert witnesses and the court held that to support
the claim of improper treatment it was necessary that he produce
expert witnesses. But the court held defendant was liable as he had
a duty to "inform him [plaintiff] generally of the possible serious
collateral hazards .... ,,68 In relying upon the Steele case, the court
recognized that there was no mention in Steele of this duty to warn,
but they asserted that Steele pointed out there was a duty to "com-
municate the advise of a treatment"6 7 and that this should have served
as warning for defendant under the facts of the present case.68
This doctrine of a duty to warn of serious possible collateral hazards
has found its way into the law of several other jurisdictions.69 Al-
though the court found authority for the Mitchell decision in the
Steele case, none in fact exists. In Steele the Supreme Court decided
only that after proof that the average practitioner would communicate
the advice of operation to his patient, defendant's failure to do so was
an actionable breach. This was not even contested by defendant. In
Mitchell, however, no evidence was offered to prove that the average
practitioner would inform the patient of the possible collateral haz-
ards of shock treatment, but rather the court manufactured out of
whole cloth this new addition to the duty of the medical practitioner.
If the source of this doctrine were the only fault that could be as-
serted, then it would scarcely be worth attack. There are undoubtedly
situations in which a medical practitioner should inform a patient
of the serious possible collateral hazards that might attend a proposed
treatment, just as there are situations in which it would be thought
unwise to inform the patient of all the possible catastrophies that
66. Id. at 19.
67. Id. at 16.
68. The court in Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ. Board of Trustees, 154
Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d. 170 (1957), pointed out that the issue in this class of
cases is whether or not plaintiff has had sufficient information upon which to
base an intelligent consent. If the information is not sufficient, then the consent
is inoperative. It would then seem to follow that plaintiff could proceed on a
battery theory rather than negligence. However, battery does not seem to be an
action that is favored by plaintiff's counsel. In Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239
(Mo. 1961), defendant dentist had been authorized to extract several teeth by a
referral card and mistakenly extracted eight of plaintiff's teeth. Plaintiff sued in
malpractice and recovered, but it is submitted that the case could have been more
easily handled as a simple battery.
69. Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1028 (1961).
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could befall him.70 The problem could be approached in three ways;
first, the court could establish a rule that there was no duty to inform
of possible serious collateral hazards ;71 second, the court could, as
they do in the Mitchell case, hold that there is an absolute duty to in-
form of serious possible collateral hazards. Both of these approaches
have obvious flaws. In the one many innocent defendants will be held
liable and as a result patients will eventually be informed of matters
that it were better for them not to know.7 2 In the other system,
culpable defendants will escape liability.
It is submitted that there is a third approach that is more consistent
with the Missouri law as a whole. The question of whether or not
defendant had a duty to inform the patient of the serious possible
collateral hazards should be a question of fact for the jury to decide
on the basis of what the average practitioner would do in the circum-
stances.73 This would measure the practitioner according to the
standards that have become fixed in Missouri for the past fifty years,
instead of imposing an arbitrary standard of conduct that could lead
to unpleasant results for both practitioners and patients.7 4
What the fate of the Mitchell case will be cannot be predicted. The
Supreme Court has not been confronted with the problem and it may
reject or modify the doctrine. The bar, in seeking a solution, may
draft a new form to be signed by patients before the practitioner will
agree to treat him. The form would include all possible" collateral
hazards that might arise in the course of treatment and would be
given to the patient for his signature with the operative release.
Although" this seems a rather foolish way of nullifying the result of
70. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
71. In Kenny v. Lockwood, I D.L.R. 507 (1932), the court held:
To fasten on a physician or surgeon the obligation to discuss with his
patient the possibilities and probabilities of an operation . . .in order that
the patient might make an election... is in my mind unwarranted.
72. In a letter from Dr. M. A. Cassel to the author, Feb. 5, 1962, Dr. Cassel
said:
the practical effect of relating to a patient prior to operation all the possible
catastrophies that could befall him would either discourage him from the
operation or debilitate his mental condition to the point that recuperation
would be severely impaired. (Emphasis added.)
73. This is the approach adopted in Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d
1093 (1960).
74. Dr. Cassel asserted that there are surgeons who now refuse to do certain
operations because of the exposure to liability if the patient is dissatisfied. Letter
from Dr. M. A. Cassel to the author, Feb. 5, 1962.
75. The choice of the word "possible" by the court in the Mitchell case could
conceivably create a monster that could not be controlled. Any poor result that
was serious in nature about which the practitioner failed to warn would expose
him to liability. The possibilities are unlimited since the bad result itself proves
that the hazard was "possible."
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the Mitchell case, it may be the one to which the bar will resort if the
doctrine survives.
Summary of the Duty of the Medical Practitioner
The duty of the malpractice defendant has been considerably dim-
inished from the duty of the negligence defendant. The care that he
must exercise is neither reasonable nor is it prudent. It need not be
his "best" care or skill as long as it conforms to the average skill and
care that is employed in the community. In establishing the standard,
the attention of the fact finder is focused not upon what should or
would have been done, but rather it is placed on what is done. The
"same school" requirement precludes the plaintiff from attacking
the system of medicine to which the practitioner adheres and the
"similar localities" rule reduces even further the knowledge for which
the practitioner can be held accountable. Because of these limitations
on the duty of the medical practitioner, he is, to a great extent, in-
sulated from liability. Indeed, the "plaintiff in a malpractice action
assumes a very heavy burden."78
Why has the law built such a strong protective shell around the
practitioner in defining the limits of his duty? There are two ex-
tremely compelling reasons; first, the social value of the function that
the medical practitioner performs cannot be exaggerated. A society
without medical practitioners is inconceivable. However, this fact
alone would be inadequate to grant him such great protection. The
second reason for limiting the extent of the practitioner's duty is the
extremely high degree of risk with which he is faced in the perform-
ance of his everyday business. These two facts taken together, the
high degree of risk encountered daily which necessitates vast exposure
to liability, and the social value of the function that he performs in
society are ample reasons for the protection afforded him.77
II. BREACH AND PROOF OF BREACH
The duty that the medical practitioner owes to his patient is born of
a consensual relationship. This section will be concerned with the
76. Hopkins v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 473, 476 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
77. Professor Morris suggests a third reason for confining the liability of the
medical practitioner. He urges that
a doctor who loses a malpractice case stands to lose more than the amount
of the judgment-he may also lose his professional reputation and his liveli-
hood. These considerations heighten the need for a test of malpractice that
will protect doctors against undeserved liability.... The reasonbly prudent
man "test" would enable the ambulance chaser to make a law suit out of
any protracted illness.
Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 CoLuM. L. Rzv. 1147, 1165 (1942). This pro-
vides a rather ready answer to those who would expand the medical practitioner's
liability because he is most likely insured and therefore a better loss distributor
than the injured patient.
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nature and the characteristics of the acts that amount to a breach of
that duty and relationship, and the nature and degree of proof that is
required to establish that a breach has occurred.
For purposes of analysis it would be beneficial to divide the doctor-
patient relationship into two parts: diagnosis and treatment. The
nature of the acts that amount to a breach and the characteristics of
the proof required to establish a breach vary according to the phase of
the doctor-patient relationship during which the breach is alleged to
have occurred. Thus if P awakes from an operation to find that his
leg is paralyzed, the nature of the act or omission that he must allege
and the degree of proof which he will be required to produce in order
to establish a cause of action in malpractice, will depend upon the
phase during which he alleges that the breach occurred.
A. Diagnosis
Diagnosis is the recognition of a disease by analysis of symptoms7 8
Hence when a practitioner examines a patient he initially analyzes
the manifested symptoms and decides what the nature of the plain-
tiff's ailment is. It is this act of diagnosis with which this subsection
is concerned.
The general rule was stated by the court in Trask v. Dunnigan12
the court concluded that "mistaken diagnosis... unless followed by
improper treatment . . . would afford no cause of action."'' s This
general rule is subject, however, to several exceptions and numerous
qualifications. They can best be illustrated by a series of hypothetical
situations.
1. Improper diagnosis8l followed by the diagnosing
practitioner's proper treatment
This is in fact the situation involved in the Traskc case.82 A medical
practitioner making an improper diagnosis but applying the correct
treatment is not liable in malpractice for a bad result.
78. See BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
79. 299 S.W. 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927). See also, Sibert v. Boger, 260 S.W.2d
569 (Mo. 1953); Gottschall v. Geiger, 207 Mo. App. 89, 231 S.W. 87 (1921). Cf.,
Fausette v. Grim, 193 Mo. 585, 186 S.W. 1177 (1916).
80. Trask v. Dunnigan, 299 S.W. 116, 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
81. Improper diagnosis means diagnosis in violation of the practitioner's duty.
See generally, duty section supra.
82. In the Trask case plaintiff went to defendant who diagnosed his condition
as a sprained arm. Defendant then applied a splint to plaintiff's arm. The
arm was in fact broken and the break healed poorly. Defendant proved at the
trial that the splint that he applied would have been the proper treatment for
the broken arm. Although the court chose to frame the rule that there will be
no liability for improper diagnosis unless followed by improper treatment, a
simpler ground of decision would have been that defendant's negligence was not a
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2. Improper diagnosis followed by the diagnosing
practitioner's improper treatment
In this situation the medical practitioner is held liable,83 but the
basis of his liability is not the improper diagnosis, but rather it is the
improper treatment. Thus the rules that would determine the practi-
tioner's liability in this situation are the rules that obtain in the treat-
ment cases.8 4
3. Improper diagnosis followed by improper treatment of
another practitioner based upon the formers erroneous diagnosis
The practitioner who made the improper diagnosis should not
according to the rule be held liable in malpractice. If, however, he
retains control over the practitioner who renders the treatment" or if
the diagnosis and treatment are a part of a joint enterprise,86 the
diagnosing practitioner may be liable. 7 The physician who improp-
erly treats the patient on the basis of the former practitioner's er-
roneous diagnosis is held liable in malpractice. As the court noted in
Baird v. National Health Foundation,8 "a physician is liable if he
negligently adopts as his own the erroneous diagnosis and treatment
of another doctor, if he has opportunity to discover the true facts for
himself .... "89 But in this situation the rules that apply in determin-
ing liability are the rules for the treatment cases as the improper
treatment in reality forms the basis of the liability.
4. Improper diagnosis which because of its very nature
precludes the patient from seeking proper treatment
In this situation the practitioner could preclude the patient from
taking any further action either by diagnosing the disease as ex-
tremely serious or insignificant. In either event the patient might be
persuaded by the diagnosis to seek no further treatment and accept
the finding of the practitioner. Thus if P broke out in large black
spots and became severely swollen and D diagnosed this as a mild
cold, P by the force of this diagnosis might be persuaded merely to
cause in fact of plaintiff's injury, i.e., even had defendant properly diagnosed
the broken arm, the treatment would have been the same and the result--poor
mending-would have still ensued.
83. Boyd v. Andrae, 44 S.W.2d 891 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932); Lewis v. McClellan,
1 S.W.2d 247 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928).
84. See text accompanying notes 92-95 inf!a.
85. Noren v. American School of Osteopathy, 298 S.W. 1061 (Mo. Ct. App.
1927).
86. Baird v. National Health Foundation, 235 Mo. App. 594, 144 S.W.2d 850
(1940).
87. The problems of vicarious liability are beyond the scope of this note.
88. 285 Mo. App. 594, 114 S.W.2d 850 (1940).
89. Id. at 608, 144 S.W.2d at 857.
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go home and rest. If liability is to be imposed on the practitioner in
this situation there are two approaches that could be employed. It
would be possible to characterize what the practitioner has done as
implying that there is no treatment available for the disease. This
act90 would amount to a 'negative' treatment and would then be
evaluated according to the rules that obtain in the treatment cases.
A more direct approach would be to hold that the practitioner was
liable solely because of his improper diagnosis which has precluded
the patient from taking any further action."1
B. T'eatment
The overwhelming majority of the malpractice cases that have been
reported in Missouri deal with the treatments that are employed by
medical practitioners. This area of the Missouri law has also pre-
sented the most confusing doctrines and apparently contradictory
cases. It is submitted that the reason for the confusion and the dif-
ficulty is the failure of the Missouri Supreme Court to articulate a
very important distinction. The Kansas City Court of Appeals
announced the doctrine in their decision in Coffey v. Tiffany 2 which
was subsequently quashed by the Supreme Court on a point of evi-
dence without any mention of the distinction that the Kansas City
Court had drawn. In the Coffey case plaintiff had gone to the de-
fendant to have her eyes treated. Defendant placed some drops in
them, and plaintiff was caused extreme pain and loss of vision in the
eye treated. Plaintiff claimed that defendant had given her the wrong
drops. The court held:
In that case [referring to another case] the court properly recog-
nized the distinction between matters of science and those of art.
As to the former, an honest error of a legally qualified physician
or surgeon cannot afford a cause of action, no matter how injuri-
ous it may be to the patient, while in matters of art, i. e., in the
performance of surgery, or in the application of remedies, his
negligent errors are held to be governed by the ordinary rules of
negligence. Thus a physician should not be held liable for er-
roneously, but honestly, deciding to perform a surgical operation
upon a patient, for that would be an error in a matter of science
and the law would be too harsh and severe should practitioners
of medicine or surgery be held to know at their peril what were
best to be done in a given case. But a surgeon who uses an un-
clean or rusty knife in an operation, or a physician who admin-
isters a dose of medicine without knowing what it is, would be
90. See BECHT AND ILLER, FACTUAL CAUSATION (1961).
91. In Baird v. National Health Foundation, 235 Mo. App. 594, 144 S.W.2d 850
(1940), it is difficult to say what the rationale is that the court employs. They
find little difficulty in imposing liability in the ease notwithstanding the Trask case.
92. 192 Mo. App. 455, 182 S.W. 495 (1914).
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guilty of failing to exercise reasonable care, since an ordinarily
careful surgeon or physician would not use an unclean knife, or
administer a medicine without knowing what it isY3
Although the terms "art" and "science" could be more aptly described
as "administration of the remedy" and "selection of the remedy," this
court recognized a distinction that the Missouri courts have consist-
ently followed until the present time.
It recognized that the act of treatment was divided into two phases.
First, the practitioner after having ascertained the nature of the
disease [diagnosis], decides what remedy to use to cure the disease.
Second, the practitioner applies the remedy. The rules for determin-
ing liability can only be ascertained after having fixed the point at
which the alleged breach occurs.
Many decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court and of inferior
Missouri courts have recognized that the degree of proof required to
make a prima facie case varied depending upon the characteristics of
the acts that were proved as the breach.94 No court has articulated
the distinction, but they have all generally followed it. 95
93. Id. at 470, 182 S.W. at 499.
94. In Williams v. Chamberlain, 316 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1958), the court clearly
recognized that there was a distinction between cases involving foreign objects
and other malpractice cases. The court held that "the cases where a physician or
surgeon has left foreign objects in operative cavities fall into an entirely different
claWs." Id. at 511. (Emphasis added.) However, the court failed to express what
that "different class" was.
In York v. Daniels, 259 S.W.2d 109, 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953), plaintiff used
no expert witnesses and the court held that "it is not always necessary that
failure to use the accepted method in treatment should be proved by expert wit-
nesses." But the court failed to point out when it is and when it is not necessary
to produce experts in order to make a submissible jury case.
In Baird v. National Health Foundation, 235 Mo. App. 594, 144 S.W.2d 850,
855 (1940), defendants appealed from a jury verdict for plaintiff alleging plaintiff
had failed to make a submissible case because he failed to produce expert wit-
nesses. They held that "in a case of this kind negligence can be proved by non
expert witnesses." But once again the court failed to say what kind of case
this was.
Pedigo v. Roseberry, 340 Mo. 724, 736, 102 S.W.2d 600, 607 (1937), the court
came very close to announcing the rationale when they held that:
Juries should not be thus turned loose and privileged to say, perchance, the
method of treating an injury . . . was negligent notwithstanding, for in-
stance, the uncontradicted competent testimony establish that the uniformly
adopted practice of the most skillful surgeons had been followed. (Emphasis
added.)
Although the Pedigo case seems to be inconsistent with the holding in the Baird
and York cases, the decision will be justified later when the ramifications of the
distinction between "selection" and "administration" are developed herein.
In Tate v. Tyzzer, 208 Mo. App. 290, 234 S.W. 1038, 1041 (1921), defendant
requested an instruction that if the jury found that defendant had conformed with
the customary practice in the community that he should not be held liable. The
court held,
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Thus when any question arises as to the liability of a practitioner
for the treatment that he has given to a patient, it must be decided
initially whether the basis of the liability is the improper selection of
the remedy or whether it is the maladministration of the remedy. If
it is the former, then the rules that obtain in deciding the question
are sui generis. If the case is classified as the latter, then the rules
that apply in the determination of liability are substantially the same
as the rules that apply in the determination of an ordinary negligence
case.
1. The Use of Custom
As discussed above 9l the use of custom in the ordinary negligence
case is by the majority view merely evidence of due care or negligence.
However, if the case involves the alleged improper selection of the
remedy by the practitioner, the custom of the medical practice be-
comes the controlling standard. In Bailey v. St. Louis S. F. Ry.01
plaintiff had sustained a rupture. The treatment prescribed by de-
fendant was rest and observation in a hospital. Plaintiff attempted to
prove at the trial that the selection of the treatment was improper. To
This contention cannot be upheld. Without passing upon the question as to
whether or not it correctly declares the law under certain conditions, this
instruction permits the defendant to rely upon a special and local custom to
take his case out of the general rules of law.
Thus it can be seen that the Missouri courts have recognized throughout the
years that there are cases in which experts are needed and in which they are not
needed, cases in which custom is controlling and in which it is not controlling.
But they have never taken the time to announce the basis of the distinction.
95. Compare Williams v. Chamberlain, supra note 94; Brown v. Scullin Steel,
260 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1953); Pedigo v. Roseberry, supra note 94; Atkinson v.
American School of Osteopathy, 240 Mo. 338, 144 S.W. 820 (1912), with Snyder
v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 228 Mo. App. 626, 72 S.W.2d 504 (1934); Bailey v.
St. Louis S.F. Ry., 296 S.W. 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927); McDonald v. Crider, 272
S.W. 980 (Mo Ct. App. 1925); Smith v. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 212 Mo.
App. 158, 251 S.W. 155 (1923) ; Fausette v. Grim, 193 Mo. App. 585, 186 S.W. 1177
(1916); Spain v. Burch, 169 Mo. App. 94, 154 S.W. 172 (1913); Reed v. Laughlin,
332 Mo. 424, 58 S.W.2d 440 (1933); Gates v. Dr. Nichol's Sanatorium, 331 Mo.
724, 55 S.W.2d 424 (1932); Rothschild v. Barck, 324 Mo. 1121, 26 S.W.2d 760
(1930); York v. Daniels, 259 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953); Seewald v. Gentry,
220 Mo. App. 367, 286 S.W. 445 (1926); Evans v. Clapp, 231 S.W. 79 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1921); Tate v. Tyzzer, supra note 94; Gross v. Robinson, 203 Mo. App. 118,
218 S.W. 924 (1920); Reeves v. Lutz, 179 Mo. App. 61, 162 S.W. 280 (1914);
Waters v. Crites, 350 Mo. 553, 166 S.W.2d 496 (1942). But see Shipper v. Dr.
C. M. Coe, Inc., 174 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943).
96. See text accompanying footnote 37 infra.
97. 296 S.W. 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927). See contra, Shipper v. Dr. C. M. Coe,
Inc., 174 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943); Waters v. Crites, 350 Mo. 553, 166
S.W.2d 496 (1942); Gunter v. Whitener, 75 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934);
Thompson v. Martin, 127 Mo. App. 24, 106 S.W. 535 (1904). It is submitted
that these cases were erroneously decided because of the court's failure to articu-
late the distinction between application and selection of the remedy.
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this end he introduced several expert witnesses who testified that in
this situation they would have operated and that that was the accepted
method of treating hernia in their community. Defendant introduced
several experts who testified that the treatment that defendant em-
ployed was entirely proper. The case was submitted to the jury and
the judgment was for the plaintiff. In reversing the judgment the
court held that plaintiff had failed to establish a submissible jury case
even though he had produced more expert witnesses than had the
defendant. The court held:
Physicians and surgeons must be allowed a wide range in the
exercise of their judgment and discretion .... the law will not
hold a physician guilty of negligence as long as he uses his bestjudgment, even though his judgment may prove erroneous in a
given case, unless it be shown that the course pursued was clearly
against the course recognized as correct by the profession gen-
erally.98
This case would seem to support the doctrine that custom is a defense
for the malpractice defendant. However, in Tate v. Tyzzer 99 de-
fendant offered expert testimony that surgical sponges were accounted
for by the nurse and that this was the customary practice among
surgeons in this community. Plaintiff offered no countervailing testi-
mony. Defendant requested an instruction that if the jury found that
he had used the customary practice that was employed in the com-
munity then they should find for defendant. The court held, "this
contention cannot be upheld .... this instruction permits the de-
fendant to rely upon a special and local custom to take this case out of
the general rules of law ...
Although the cases are on the surface inconsistent, they seem so
only because they are dealing with two separate types of actions with
the difference not made clear. The Bailey case deals with the selection
of the proper remedy and the Tate case is concerned with the im-
proper administration of a remedy. The rule then could be stated that
in cases involving the selection of the remedy, custom is a complete
defense for the practitioner. The plaintiff in the "selection" cases
must show by something more than a mere preponderance that the
remedy employed by the practitioner was against the course employed
by the practice generally. In those cases in which the practitioner is
alleged to have administered the treatment improperly, plaintiff need
not establish that the administration was not customary in the com-
munity. As a corollary to this rule, defendant cannot avoid liability
by establishing that the administration of the treatment was in con-
98. Bailey v. St. Louis S.F. Ry., supra at 4. 296 S.W. 477, 479 (Mo. Ct. App.
1927). (Emphasis added.)
99. 208 Mo. App. 290, 234 S.W. 1038 (1921).
100. Id. at 302, 234 S.W. at 1041.
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formity with the administration that is used in the community gen-
erally.
2. The Expert Witness
Use of the expert witness in malpractice cases and the rules as to
his competency are discussed above.l10 However, the question of when
an expert witness is necessary will be treated in this section.
In Pedigo v. Roseberry"02 the practitioner used a "box cast" on the
patient's broken leg. Patient at the trial complained of this method of
treatment. Defendant offered experts who testified as to the propriety
of the treatment that defendant employed. The case was submitted
to the jury and the judgment was for plaintiff. In reversing the judg-
ment the court held:
Juries should not be thus turned loose and privileged to say,
perchance, the method of treating an injury . . . was negligent
notwithstanding... uncontradicted competent testimony....203
In Sontag v. Ude'10 defendant failed to anchor a drain tube to the
infant patient and it slipped within the patient's chest. Plaintiff
offered no expert witnesses to prove that defendant's administration
of the remedy was negligent. The court held that,
We do not believe that on such facts any jury would say that the
acts of defendant did not constitute negligence, no matter how
many expert professional gentlemen might have testified to the
contrary.105
The Pedigo case seems to stand for the proposition that expert testi-
mony is indispensable to the plaintiff's cause of action, while the
Sontag case indicates that it is not only not indispensable, but that
it cannot afford the defendant any protection as a defense. Although
the decisions seem contradictory, this again is because they are deal-
ing with two distinctly different types of actions without indicating
the difference.
The Pedigo ease involves the selection of the proper remedy, while
the allegation in the Sontag case is concerned with maladministration
of the remedy. The rule then may be stated that in cases in which the
issue is the proper selection of the remedy, plaintiff must produce
expert witnesses in order to make a submissible jury case. As a
corollary to this rule the defendant if he produces sufficient counter-
vailing experts will be entitled to a directed verdict. 100 In cases in
101. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
102. 340 Mo. 724, 102 S.W.2d 600 (1937).
103. Id. at 736, 102 S.W.2d at 607.
104. 191 Mo. App. 617, 177 S.W. 659 (1915).
105. Id. at 626, 177 S.W. at 661-62.
106. See, e.g., Brown v. Scullin Steel, 260 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1953); Pedigo v.
Roseberry, 340 Mo. 724, 102 S.W.2d 600 (1937); Snyder v. St. Louis S.W. Ry.,
Co., 228 Mo. App. 626, 72 S.W.2d 504 (1934); Bailey v. St. Louis S.F. Ry. Co.,
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which the issue is the propriety of the administration of the remedy
plaintiff need not produce experts to make a submissible jury case
nor will defendant be entitled to directed verdict on the strength of
expert testimony.107
3. Inferential Evidence
Due to the peculiar nature of malpractice actions, plaintiff will
often find himself in a situation in which he has no information
about the way in which he was injured. If the law of malpractice
precluded plaintiff from using circumstantial evidence to establish
his prima facie case, many plaintiffs would find themselves with an
insurmountable task. In every phase of malpractice, plaintiff is al-
lowed to establish his case with the aid of circumstantial evidence.
The degree to which he may use such evidence and the situations in
which he may rely upon it exclusively, vary depending upon whether
the action is predicated upon the improper selection of the remedy or
whether it is predicated upon the maladministration of the remedy.
In Eicholz v. Poe""8 plaintiff went to the hospital for an operation.
While she was recuperating, she reported a toothache and her doctor
recommended that the tooth be extracted. A dentist was called in, and
in the process of pulling the tooth he broke plaintiff's jaw. Plaintiff
pleaded only that the result of a broken jaw implied negligence and
the court held:
[W] e think the extraction of the tooth, being under the manage-
ment and control of defendants was sufficiently out of the or-
dinary course of that which usually happens where ordinary
care and skill is employed, in the absence of explanation by de-
fendants to warrant the jury in finding that the tooth was
negligently extracted .... 109
The court without expressly denominating it as such is applying the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. They find little difficulty in applying
it to the facts of the Eicholz case.
However, five years later in Cardinale v. Kemp 110 defendant practi-
296, S.W. 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927); Fausette v. Grim, 193 Mo. App. 585, 186
S.W. 1177 (1916).
107. See, e.g., York v. Daniels, 259 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953); Baird v.
National Health Foundation, 144 S.W.2d 850 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940); Seewald v.
Gentry, 220 Mo. App. 367, 286 S.W. 445 (1926); Tate v. Tyzzer, 208 Mo. App.
290, 234 S.W. 1038 (1921); Gottschall v. Geiger, 207 Mo. App. 89, 231 S.W. 87
(1921).
108. 217 S.W. 282 (Mo. 1920). See also, Williams v. Chamberlain, 316 S.W.2d
505 (Mo. 1958); State ex rel. American School of Osteopathy v. Daues, 323 Mo.
411, 18 S.W.2d 487 (1929) ; Cardinale v. Kemp, 309 Mo. 241, 274 S.W. 437 (1925) ;
Pate v. Dumbauld, 298 Mo. 45, 250 S.W. 49 (1923) ; Mitchell v. Poole, 299 Mo. App.
1, 68 S.W.2d 833 (1934); Hill v. Jackson, 218 Mo. App. 210, 265 S.W. 859 (1924);
Wilt v. McCallum, 214 Mo. App. 321, 253 S.W. 156 (1923); Connelly v. Cone, 205
Mo. App. 395, 224 S.W. 1011 (1920).
109. Eicholz v. Poe, 217 S.W. 282, 285 (Mo. 1920).
110. 309 Mo. 241, 274 S.W. 437 (1925).
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tioner had removed a cyst from plaintiff's eyelid. Defendant had
chosen to remove it by turning the lid back and removing it from
the inside of the lid. Plaintiff's eyeball grew to the lid and he lost his
vision in that eye. Plaintiff attempted to introduce testimony of ex-
perts that this was not the sort of thing that happened in the normal
course of events and that the selection of the operation was improper.
Trial court excluded the evidence and directed a verdict for defen-
dant.-" On appeal the directed verdict for defendant was affirmed,
the court holding that plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case.
The Eicholz decision and the decision in the Cardinale case hardly
seem consonant. In the former, the court finds no difficulty in freely
applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur while in the latter they re-
fuse even to accept evidence that might tend to establish the proba-
bility postulate. However, the cases can be justified on the basis of
the distinction between selection and administration of the remedy.
The attorney in the Eicholz case chose to plead the act of defendant
as maladministration, while the attorney for plaintiff in the Cardinale
case couched his action in improper selection of the remedy. It is
submitted that a different result might have been achieved in the
Cardinale case had the attorney for the plaintiff attempted to char-
acterize the act of defendant as maladministration of treatment. For
the rule may be stated that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will be
applied in those cases which involve the administration of the treat-
ment when the postulates are fulfilled, and it will not be applied in
those cases in which the issue involves selection of the remedy, even
if it appears that the postulates are satisfied.1 1 2
Although plaintiff may rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
in those cases which involve the administration of the treatment,
the probability postulate is often quite difficult to satisfy. In Hill v.
Jackson113 decided four years after Eicholz v. Poe, plaintiff went to
defendant dentist to have a tooth extracted. In the course of the
extraction defendant dislocated plaintiff's jaw. The court held that
plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case as they were not con-
vinced that dislocation does not occur even when the dentist exercises
due care. The court has held that the postulate was satisfied, how-
ever, when an osteopath partially dislocated a patient's neck.2' As a
general rule, it is clear that the probability postulate will be more
difficult to satisfy in a malpractice action than in an ordinary negli-
111. Plaintiff's counsel failed to make an offer of proof at the trial, but the
court indicated that it would not have been willing to reverse even had a proper
offer been made.
112. See, e.g., Cardinale v. Kemp, 309 Mo. 241, 274 S.W. 437 (1925).
113. 218 Mo. App. 210, 265 S.W. 859 (1924).
114. York v. Daniels, 259 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
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gence case.1" 5 Plaintiff will also be precluded from relying upon the
doctrine if specific negligence is alleged.116
If the theory employed by plaintiff is that defendant's selection of
the remedy was negligent, the proof that plaintiff offers must of
necessity be direct. There are no presumptions of which he may avail
himself. If plaintiff's theory sounds rather in the maladministration
of the remedy, there are several situations in which he may avail
himself of the benefit of a presumption. Cases in which foreign bodies
are left within operative cavities provide an excellent example.
In Sontag v. Ude1 7 defendant practitioner inserted a tube in plain-
tiff's decedent's chest to drain an abscess. The drain was improperly
anchored and fell within the operative cavity. Plaintiff produced
only two witnesses, neither of whom was an expert. Defendant put
on no evidence and appealed from a jury verdict for plaintiff. The
court held that experts were not necessary to plaintiff's cause of
action. Further, even had the defendant produced many experts to
testify as to the propriety of the treatment, plaintiff would still have
made a submissible jury case.1 s The Sontag case held that proof of
a foreign object left within an operative cavity establishes a pre-
sumption of breach that cannot be dispelled even by expert evidence.
The holding in Sontag is subject, however, to proof of the fact that
it was defendant who left the foreign object within the cavity. This
rule was established in Boner v. Nicholson."9 Defendant in the Boner
case offered expert evidence that the injury of which plaintiff com-
plained could not possibly have been caused by the sponge that de-
fendant had allegedly left within the cavity and that the sponge
could not have been left within the operative cavity by defendant.
115. Denying res ipsa loquitur: Williams v. Chamberlain, 316 S.W.2d 505
(Mo. 1958) (broken needle); Mitchell v. Poole, 229 Mo. App. 1, 68 S.W.2d 833
(1934) (broken needle); Hill v. Jackson, 218 Mo. App. 210, 265 S.W. 859 (1924)
(dislocated jaw); Wilt v. McCallum, 214 Mo. App. 321, 253 S.W. 156 (1923)
(doctrine does not apply to complicated machinery); Connelly v. Cone, 205 Mo.
App. 395, 224 S.W. 1011 (1920) (setting broken bone). But see Evans v. Clapp,
231 S.W. 79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921); Hales v. Raines, 146 Mo. App. 232, 130 S.W.
425 (1910) holding the postulate satisfied when plaintiff sustained x-ray burns.
116. See, e.g., Telaneus v. Simpson, 321 Mo. 724, 12 S.W.2d 920 (1928) ; Owens
v. McCleary, 313 Mo. 213, 281 S.W. 682 (1926); Pate v. Dumbauld, 298 Mo. 435,
250 S.W. 49 (1923).
117. 191 Mo. App. 617, 177 S.W. 659 (1915); See also, Null v. Stewart, 78
S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1934); Hilton v. Mudd, 174 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943);
Ingram v. Poston, 260 S.W. 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924); Tate v. Tyzzer, 208 Mo.
App. 290, 234 S.W. 1038 (1921) ; Reeves v. Lutz, 179 Mo. App. 61, 162 S.W. 280
(1914). But see, Williams v. Chamberlain, 316 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1958) (broken
needle); Boner v. Nicholson, 179 Mo. App. 146, 161 S.W. 309 (1913).
118. Sontag v. Ude, 191 Mo. App. 617, 626, 177 S.W. 659, 661 (1915).
119. 179 Mo. App. 146, 161 S.W. 309 (1913).
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However, the doctrine in the Boner case was limited to its unusual
facts in a subsequent decision.120
In Null v. Stewartul the court modified the statement in Sontag and
asserted with clarity that proof of a foreign body left within an
operative cavity "makes a prima [facie] case of negligence, and all
that plaintiff need do in order to make a prima facie case is to prove
that such foreign substance was in fact left inside the patient's
body. 122 A prima facie case of negligence is raised by proof of a
foreign body left within an operative cavity. However, this case can
be rebutted by defendant if he chooses to come forward with counter-
vailing proof. In Hilton v. Mudd=2' defendant appealed from a jury
verdict for plaintiff alleging an improper instruction as error. The
court had instructed the jury that if it found that defendant had left
a sponge within plaintiff, then it would hold defendant liable in
damages. The court held that:
The trouble with this view is that an instruction which directs a
verdict without requiring a finding of negligence is not sufficient
in submitting facts merely making a prima facie case. It must
submit facts making a case as a matter of law. 1 2
There are other presumptions of which plaintiff may avail him-
self if he alleges maladministration of the remedy.225
Thus, if plaintiff alleges that defendant has improperly selected
the remedy he will be unable to employ presumptions in proving his
case. Plaintiff in an action for the improper selection of the remedy
will be bound by rather narrow, unwavering rules. There is an
absolute necessity for expert witnesses and the burden of proof
approaches the equity burden of "clear and convincing." Custom
will afford the practitioner a perfect defense in the "selection" cases.
But when the action is characterized as maladministration of the
remedy, plaintiff may proceed according to rules that are very
similiar to the rules that obtain in the normal negligence case. There
are no special defenses available to defendant. No case that is re-
ported in Missouri has answered the question who decides whether
the issue is improper selection of the remedy or whether it is mal-
administration. It is patent that plaintiff's counsel should attempt to
characterize the act of the practitioner as maladministration, while
defendant should attempt to characterize the allegation as improper
selection. There are situations that admit of both possibilities. 12 It
120. Ingram v. Poston, 260 S.W. 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924).
121. 78 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1934)
122. Id. at 79.
123. 174 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943).
124. Id. at 37.
125. Id. at 36.
126. See text accompanying notes 110-112 supra.
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is submitted that this characterization is essentially a court function.'27
The distinction between the two classes of cases may seem at first
to be arbitrary. However, the necessity for such a doctrine be-
comes obvious upon closer inspection. This doctrine is both a shield
and a sword, protecting the medical practitioner where he needs
protection and affording him no special privileges where he needs
none. It is essential that the medical practitioner be protected in the
exercise of his judgment when he is selecting the proper remedy to
apply to a patient's symptoms. This is necessary not only to im-
munize the practitioner from undeserved liability, but it is also
mandatory for the public,12 8 for if the practitioner must exercise his
judgment and discretion at his peril, medical science would come to
a screaming halt.
On the other hand, there is no very compelling reason for afford-
ing the medical practitioner a shield in the administration of the
remedy. The law need not shelter the practitioner who is careless
in his technique. Nor will he be sheltered from liability because he
alone possesses the ultimate facts that are essential to establishing
his negligence. Indeed, if the practitioner were granted the same
protections in the administration of the remedy as he is in the selec-
tion, the law would foster truly deleterious developments in the prac-
tice of medicine. Thus, the Missouri law of malpractice has established
a doctrine that has the peculiar attributes of allowing the practice of
medicine to flourish by not interfering with its essential elements of
judgment and discretion. These elements are judged and sanc-
tioned only by the standards that the medical profession itself estab-
lishes. 12 9 However, the distinction that the Missouri courts have
established stunts those practices that are harmful to the medical
profession as well as to the general public.
III. DEFENSES
The defense of conformity to the custom of practice employed in
the community has been discussed above.1" 0
A. Assumption of Risk
The Missouri courts have specifically rejected the defense of as-
sumption of risk whenever a malpractice defendant has chosen to
127. Although the issue has never been presented to a court, this would appear
to be a typical court function.
128. See note 74, supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 93-95 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 96-100 supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss3/7
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
offer it.231 In Hales v. Raines232 plaintiff went to defendant seeking
treatment for a red spot on his hand. Defendant before treating
plaintiff with x-rays warned him of the dangers of x-ray treatment.
Plaintiff was explicitly warned "that there was always peril"1 3 in
this sort of treatment. Defendant interposed a defense that amounted
to assumption of risk to which the St. Louis Court of Appeals replied,
We deem it to be contrary to the precepts of public policy to de-
clare such agreement valid in the full measure of its scope and
entail upon plaintiff, as within it, the consequences of defendant's
negligence . . . ; for consent concerning such matters avails
nothing, unless due care and skill is employed by the physician.13'
Defendant's problem with such a defense lies in a misconception of
the action of malpractice. Although the duty that defendant owes to
plaintiff arises due to a consensual relationship, that duty cannot be
diminished by contractual agreement, although it may be expanded. 1
The duty is one that is impressed upon the practitioner as a matter
of law.186
B. Contributory Negligence
The defense of contributory negligence can be a complete bar to
plaintiff's recovery in malpractice.1 37 However, where the alleged
negligence of the patient is subsequent to the practitioner's negligence
and merely aggravated the injury, the patient's negligence will go
only to the issue of damages.13 8 Thus if P is treated negligently by D
but subsequent to D's negligent treatment P acts negligently, P will
not be barred from recovery but his damages will be limited to "any
increased injury and pain of body and mind . . . occasioned by de-
fendant's negligence in treating same. 1 13 9
131. E.g., Longan v. Weltmer, 180 Mo. 322, 79 S.W. 655 (1904); Weller v.
Palapao Lab. Inc., 197 Mo. App. 47, 191 S.W. 1056 (1917).
132. 162 Mo. App. 46, 141 S.W. 918 (1911).
133. Id. at 66, 141 S.W. at 923.
134. Id. at 63, 141 S.W. at 922.
135. E.g, Vanhoover v. Berghoff, 90 Mo. 487, 3 S.W. 72 (1887). It is possible
for the practitioner to make an absolute contract to cure which would be binding
on him. Such agreement is, however, extremely unlikely. It is clear on the other
hand that the practitioner cannot contract away his tort liability.
136. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
137. Summers v. Tarpley, 208 S.W. 266 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919).
138. Fowler v. Burris, 186 Mo. App. 347, 171 S.W. 620 (1914). 41 Amf. Jun.
Physicians and Surgeons § 80 (1942).
139. Fowler v. Burris, supra note 138.
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CONCLUSION
If a model malpractice code were to be drafted, its procedural
framework would undoubtedly be quite different from the existing
Missouri law. However, it is difficult to imagine that any code, no
matter how well drafted, could accomplish more effectively what the
Missouri law of malpractice accomplishes. It is a law that weeds out
unhealthy elements in the medical practice while sedulously fostering
medical progress. It is, therefore, all the more lamentable that the
Supreme Court has never clearly announced the rationale of its de-
cisions.
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